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Abstract
We show that, despite coordination in the quality level of the components that they
provide, independent vertically-related (disintegrated) monopolists will provide products of
lower quality level than a sole integrated monopolist. Further, the integrated monopolist
achieves higher market coverage, higher consumer surplus, and higher profits. We establish
these results for any distribution of preferences in the standard model of quality
differentiation. Despite the lower quality, we also show that, for a wide class of cost
functions, price will be higher in a market of independent vertically-related monopolists. All
results are the effects of the interaction of double-marginalization, occurring in the market
of independent monopolists, with the choice of quality. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Many goods are composed of complementary components. In some of these, the
quality of the composite good is the minimum of the qualities of the component
parts. For example, a long distance phone call requires the use of long distance
lines as well as local lines at the two terminating points. The fidelity of sound in
such a phone call is the minimum of the qualities of the three services used. In
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such situations, if different links are owned by different firms (as in the post-
AT&T-divestiture world), firms need to coordinate in the determination of the
quality level of the composite good.
In this paper we examine the simple case in which there is only one composite
good demanded. We compare the world where both links are owned by the same
firm with the world where they are owned by separate entities (dual vertically-
related disintegrated monopolists). As far as pricing is concerned, this comparison
1has been done in the third chapter of Cournot (1927). He found that dual
monopolists are not able to appropriate the full benefits of a price reduction they
initiate and therefore face in effect a more inelastic demand and quote higher
prices than the sole vertically integrated monopolist. This phenomenon has been
2known as ‘‘double marginalization.’’ The focus of this paper is the effect of
double marginalization on the quality of the components and of the composite
good.
When only the composite good is demanded and its quality is the minimum of
the qualities of the components, there is no incentive for either of the dual
monopolists to produce components of different qualities even in a non-co-
operative setting; the integrated monopolist does the same. Thus, in both
ownership structures, firms are coordinating the quality levels of the components.
The interesting question is the differences in the coordinated level of quality across
regimes. Put differently, what kind of distortion in the provision of quality does
double marginalization create?
We show that, for any distribution of preferences, the dual monopolists produce
components of lower quality than the integrated sole monopolist. Therefore,
vertical disintegration has a significant adverse effect on quality provision, besides
the known effect of price increase. This result can be explained in intuitive terms
as follows: because of double marginalization, the impact of marginal improve-
ments in quality on price is higher under dual ownership. Thus, independent
monopolists can achieve the same strategic effects while providing lower quality
and saving on costs.
We also show that market coverage, consumers surplus, and profits are all lower
under vertical disintegration. We further show that, for a wide class of cost
functions and any distribution of preferences, prices will be higher under dual
ownership, despite the lower quality. Thus, vertical disintegration hurts consumers
3through both higher prices and lower quality.
1 See also Sonnenschein (1968).
2 Cournot uses a simultaneous price-setting game for complements that is very similar to the
well-known simultaneous quantity-setting game for substitutes. Some later authors have used games of
sequential choice with very similar results.
3 Note that this paper analyzes bilateral monopoly quality provision and compares it with the
provision of quality by a single integrated firm. Thus, this paper does not discuss incentives for
non-price discrimination that can arise, for example, in the present state of the telecommunications
market in the United States when a bottleneck monopolist also provides the monopolized input to a
competitive sector, as in Economides (1997).
N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 17 (1999) 903 –914 905
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the preference
and cost structures. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium of a vertically integrated
monopolist. Section 4 discusses the subgame-perfect equilibrium of two vertically-
related disintegrated monopolists. In Section 5, we make comparisons on quality
levels across ownership structures. In Section 6, we compare price levels at the
full-fledged equilibria. Extensions are presented in Section 7. Section 8 contains
concluding remarks.
2. Preferences and costs
Consider a market for good AB that is composed of components A and B
combined in a 1:1 proportion. Suppose that the quality of the composite good is
4the minimum of the quality levels of its components, q ; q 5 min(q ,q ). LetAB A B
each consumer have a different marginal willingness to pay for quality, so that the
5
utility of a consumer of type u is
U (q, p) 5uq 2 p, (1)u
where p is the price. Let u be distributed on [0, 1] with cumulative distribution
function F(u ).
6We assume zero marginal costs. Fixed costs of providing each component are
separable, f (q ) 1 f (q ). Thus, there are no cost savings from joint provisionA A B B
of A and B. We assume that both cost functions are increasing and convex in
9 9 99 99quality, f (q), f (q) . 0; f (q), f (q) . 0.A B A B
3. Vertically integrated monopolist (sole ownership)
We first consider a vertically integrated monopolist who produces a single
version of each component, A and B, and sells them as a single product AB. The
willingness-to-pay of consumers depends on the quality of the composite good,
which is the minimum of q and q . Since there is never a revenue gain associatedA B
with increasing a component’s quality above the highest quality component with
which it might be paired, and since component costs increase with quality, the
monopolist will choose the same quality for both components, so that q 5 q 5 q .A B
We assume that price discrimination is impossible; thus, the monopolist will
*quote a single p for the good AB. The marginal consumer u , who is indifferent
4 This formulation allows a firm only to reduce the value of the composite good. This is in contrast
with the model of Economides and Salop (1992) where each component adds to the value of the other.
5 Clearly this can be thought of as a normalization of the units of q with the appropriate adjustment
of the distribution of u.
6 The results can easily be reinterpreted if there are constant marginal costs.
906 N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 17 (1999) 903 –914
between buying or not buying AB, is defined by
* *u q 2 p 5 0Û u ( p,q) 5 p /q. (2)
*All consumers of types u [ [u , 1] will purchase the good; thus the monopolist’s
demand is
*D 5 1 2 F(u ). (3)
7The monopolist’s profits are:
P ( p,q) 5 pD 2 f (q) 2 f (q). (4)S A B
Although the choices of the integrated monopolist can be thought as taking
place simultaneously, it is useful for the comparisons that we will be making
below to consider them as sequential, with the quality choice preceding the price
choice. Of course, breaking the optimization in two stages does not alter its
8
solution. In the second stage, the integrated monopolist chooses price so that
* * *≠P /≠p 5 1 2 F( p /q) 2 ( p /q)f( p /q) 5 1 2 F(u ) 2u f(u ) 5 0. (5)S S S S
*Let the marginal consumer defined by (5) be u , and the implied equilibrium priceS
in this stage be p (q). Then the equilibrium profits of the last stage,S
P ( p (q),q),S S
are the objective function in the first stage; the monopolist chooses quality q to
maximize them. Let his quality choice be q . The corresponding equilibrium priceS
is p (q ). The resulting equilibrium profits of the integrated monopolist areS S
*P ; P ( p (q ),q ). (6)S S S S S
4. Independent unintegrated monopolists (dual ownership)
We now consider the case when each component is produced by a different
(independent) monopolist. The upstream monopolist produces A and the down-
stream monopolist produces B. They are sold at prices p and p , respectively, soA B
that the composite good AB is available at price p 5 p 1 p . The composite goodA B
has quality q 5 min(q ,q ). All consumers with marginal willingness to pay forA B
* *quality larger than u 5 p /q purchase the good, so that demand is D 5 1 2 F(u ),
as before. Profits for the two firms are:
7 We use the subscript ‘‘S’’ for ‘‘sole ownership’’ by a monopolist of both components.
8 2 2 2The second order condition, ≠ P /≠p 5 2 2f( p /q) /q 2 ( p /q )f 9( p /q) , 0Û uf 9(u ) /f(u ) . 2 2,S
puts a mild restriction on the acceptable distributions.
N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 17 (1999) 903 –914 907
P ( p , p ,q ,q ) 5 p D 2 f (q ) and P ( p , p ,q ,q )A A B A B A A A B A B A B
5 p D 2 f (q ). (7)B B B
9In the second stage, firms choose prices simultaneously. Firm A’s profit
maximization condition is
≠P /≠p 5 1 2 F( p /q) 2 ( p /q)f( p /q) 5 0.A A A
Firm B has an identical profit maximization condition with p substituted with p .A B
10Thus, p 5 p 5 p /2, and the profit maximization conditions can be written asA B
* * *≠P /≠p 5 ≠P /≠p 5 1 2 F(u ) 2u f(u ) /2 5 0. (8)A A B B D D D
*Let the marginal consumer defined by (8) be u , and the implied equilibrium priceD
in this stage be p (q), where ‘‘D’’ stands for ‘‘dual ownership’’. Comparison ofD
(8) with (5) reveals that the intensity of preference for quality that characterizes
11the marginal consumer is higher in dual ownership than in sole ownership,
* *u ,u . (9)S D
This implies that market coverage is lower with dual ownership than with sole
ownership.
Note that the maximization problems of the integrated and the dual monopolists
are defined for arbitrary quality levels, which do not have to be the same (but can
be the same). Moreover, quality does not appear by itself in (5) and (8), since
these are defined only in terms of market coverage. Thus, the comparison of
market coverages across market structures, in (9), is not contingent on the quality
being the same in the two cases.
Lemma 1. The intensity of preference for quality that characterizes the marginal
consumer in dual ownership is higher than in integrated (sole) monopoly,
* *u ,u . Thus, it follows that market coverage is lower in dual ownership.S D
If we start with the same quality level in the two market structures, prices will
be higher in independent ownership,
p (q) , p (q). (10)S D
This double marginalization effect was first observed by Cournot (1927).
9 This is in the Cournot tradition. Results are similar if prices are chosen sequentially.
10 The second order condition is equivalent to uf 9(u ) /f(u ) . 2 4; it is clearly implied by the second
order condition of joint ownership.
11 To prove this, evaluate ≠P /≠p at the profit maximization condition of independent ownership:S
* * * *≠P ( p (q),q) /≠p 5 2u f(u ) /2 , 0. By the concavity of P in p, it follows that u ,u .S D D D S S D
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Essentially, the root cause of the price difference is the inability of each of the dual
monopolists to appropriate the full benefits of a decrease in its own price, which
clearly the integrated monopolist is able to do.
Theorem 1 (Cournot). If the quality level is the same under both ownership
structures, the integrated (sole) monopolist will choose a lower price than the dual
vertically-related monopolists.
Anticipating the equilibrium of the second stage, each firm chooses in the first
stage the quality of its component. There is no point for either of the monopolists
to choose a higher quality than that of the complementary good. Therefore, the
dual monopolists set identical qualities, q 5 q 5 q . The particular level of q thatA B
they choose maximizes each firm’s profits,
P ( p (q) /2, p (q) /2, q, q) 5 P ( p (q) /2, p (q) /2, q, q). (11)A D D B D D
Let q be the quality choice of both firms; the implied market price for compositeD
good AB is p (q ). Finally, the equilibrium profits per firm areD D
* *P ; P ; P ( p (q ) /2, p (q ) /2, q ). (12)A B A D D D D D
5. Quality and welfare comparisons
We have already seen in Theorem 1 that, starting with the same quality level at
the first stage of the game, the market of dual monopolists will have a higher price
than that of the integrated sole monopolist. We now examine the incentives of
firms to provide different quality levels in different ownership structures. For this,
it is sufficient to examine the total impact of marginal quality changes, directly as
well as indirectly through prices, to equilibrium profits in each ownership
12
structure.
* *To evaluate the marginal effects of quality on profits dP /dq and d(P 1S A
*P ) /dq we need to differentiate totally (6) and (12) and substitute the corre-B
sponding dp /dq from total differentiation of the price first order conditions (5) and
(8), respectively. We first find dp /dq. In both (5) and (8), price p influences the
*profit maximization condition only through u . Thus, for both (5) and (8) we find
13that
12 Since both ownership structures have the same cost structure, the direct impact of quality change
on costs is the same in both ownership structures. Any difference will have to arise from the different
effects of quality changes on price in the two ownership structures.
13
*For example, naming R( p,q) the expression of the first order condition (5), R( p,q) 5 1 2 F(u ) 2
* * * *u f(u ), and applying the implicit function theorem, we have dp /dq 5 2 [(≠R /≠u )(≠u /≠q)] / [(≠R /
2
* * * * *≠u )(≠u /≠p)] 5 2 (≠u /≠q) /(≠u /≠p) 5 2 (2p /q ) /(1 /q) 5 p /q 5u , and similarly for Eq. (8).
N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 17 (1999) 903 –914 909
* * *dp /dq 5 2 (≠u /≠q) /(≠u /≠p) 5u . (13)
*Although the formula for u is the same, the impact of quality improvements,
starting from the same quality level, is different in the two regimes. This is
*because u is different in each case because equilibrium prices differ. Under dual
*ownership, price is higher, market coverage is lower, and u is higher. Thus, for
dual ownership, quality improvements have a bigger impact on price. We focus
next on the impact of quality changes on profits.
To see the impact of quality improvements on profits in each ownership
14* * *structure, we evaluate dP /dq and d(P 1 P ) /dq:S A B
* 9 9 * 9 9dP /dq 5 (dp /dq)D 2 f (q) 2 f (q) 5u D 2 f (q) 2 f (q)S A B A B
* 9 95 [P 1 f (q) 1 f (q)] /q 2 f (q) 2 f (q), (14)S A B A B
* * * 9 9d(P 1 P ) /dq 5 2 dP /dq 5 (dp /dq)D 2 f (q) 2 f (q)A B A A B
* 9 95u D 2 f (q) 2 f (q)A B
* * 9 95 [P 1 P 1 f (q) 1 f (q)] /q 2 f (q) 2 f (q).A B A B A B
(15)
The integrated monopolist realizes the highest possible profits in the absence of
price discrimination,
* * *P . P 1 P . (16)S A B
In combination with (14) and (15), this implies that, for any q,
* * *dP /dq . d(P 1 P ) /dq. (17)S A B
Thus, marginal improvements in quality have a bigger positive impact on revenues
and profits under sole monopoly than under dual monopoly. This is because the
sole monopolist is able to appropriate all the revenue benefit of an increase in
quality, while dual monopolists only keep part of the revenue increase. Since
quality improvements have a bigger impact on profits for the sole monopolist, he
chooses a higher quality level. Formally, on the assumption that the equilibrium
profits are concave in quality choice, it follows from (17) that the equilibrium
quality is higher for the integrated monopolist, q . q .S D
Theorem 2. At the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the quality-price game, the
dual (disintegrated) monopolists choose a lower quality level than the integrated
sole monopolist.
14 2 2
*A second term of dP /dq, that is p dD/dq 5 2 pf( p /q)[2p /q 1 p /q ], vanishes since the termS
* *in brackets is zero. The same is true for the second term of (dP 1 dP ) /dq.A B
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This result can also be explained through an analysis of the strategic impact of
quality improvements. We have shown that, compared to the case of integrated
monopoly, because of double marginalization, in dual ownership, marginal
15increases in quality have a bigger impact on price. Being able to sell the same
quality at a higher price than under integrated monopoly, the dual monopolists
choose a lower quality level, which is less costly to produce. Of course, the dual
monopolists do not realize higher profits than in sole ownership, since their prices
are too high because of double marginalization.
The lower market coverage with dual ownership established in Lemma 1
directly implies that, from the point of view of the consumers, dual ownership is
Pareto inferior to sole ownership. A consumer with u ,u is indifferent acrossS
ownership structures because he does not buy the good in either of them. A
consumer with u [ (u ,u ) strictly prefers sole ownership because in that regimeS D
he realizes a positive surplus, while with dual ownership he does not buy and
therefore has zero surplus. Finally, a consumer with u .u is better off in soleD
ownership if and only if
uq 2 p .uq 2 p Û u . ( p 2 p ) /(q 2 q ). (18)S S D D S D S D
Now, from Lemma 1, p /q . p /q . This impliesD D S S
p /q . ( p 2 p ) /(q 2 q ). (19)D D S D S D
Thus, u . p /q Þ u . ( p 2 p ) /(q 2 q ); that is, consumers who buy underD D S D S D
the regime of dual ownership would be better off under sole ownership. Thus, all
types of consumers are weakly better off under sole ownership. Only the
consumers who buy nothing under both regimes are indifferent across market
structures, and all other consumers are strictly better off under sole ownership.
Since profits are globally the highest at sole ownership, firms are also better off
under sole ownership.
Theorem 3. The sole ownership equilibrium is Pareto superior to the subgame-
perfect dual ownership equilibrium for both consumers and firms.
Because prices for the same quality are higher under dual ownership while
quality is lower in that regime, there can be no general deduction about the
comparison of equilibrium prices. However, the next section shows that, for a wide
class of cost functions and any distribution of preferences, the equilibrium price is
higher in bilateral monopoly than in integrated monopoly.
15 Note that there is no contradiction between the impact of quality improvements on price and on
revenue: in dual ownership the impact of a quality change on price is higher and the impact of a quality
change on profits is lower compared to the respective cases in sole ownership.
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6. Price comparisons for power cost functions
Suppose that the fixed costs of quality are a power function of q, f (q) 5A
af (q) 5 cq /2, so that the cost of producing both components is f (q) 1 f (q) 5B A B
a
cq , a . 1. We will show that for exponents a > 2, the price for the composite
good under dual ownership is higher than under sole monopoly, despite the
provision of a lower quality level under dual ownership.
We have established the marginal relationship between quality and price at the
price equilibrium in both ownership structures as
dp /dq 5 p /q. (20)
Solving this as a differential equation we have
p 5 kq, (21)
*where the k 5u is defined by (5) in sole ownership as k , and by (8) in dualS
ownership as k :D
1 2 F(k ) 2 k f(k ) 5 0, (59)S S S
1 2 F(k ) 2 k f(k ) /2 5 0. (89)D D D
As we have shown earlier, k , k .S D
The quality choice in each regime is defined by the solution of (14) and (15),
respectively. By inspection of (14) and (15) we note that, at each of these choices,
for the class of cost functions considered in this section, market-wide equilibrium
revenues in each regime are proportional to quality,
a a*pD 5 qu D 5 acq Þ p 5 acq /(1 2 F(k)). (22)
Eliminating the price between (21) and (22), we define the equilibrium quality as a
function of k (k or k ):S D
1 / (a21)q 5 v[k(1 2 F(k))] , (23)
21 / (a21)
where v ; (ac) . Then the equilibrium price is
a 1 / (a21)p 5 v[k (1 2 F(k))] . (24)
Differentiating p with respect to k we have
a21 a (22a) / (a21)dp /dk 5 vk [a(1 2 F(k)) 2 kf(k)][k (1 2 F(k))] /(a 2 1). (25)
In view of (59) and (89), dp /dk . 0 for a > 2 for k [ [k ,k ), and exceptionallyS D
dp /dk 5 0 at k 5 k when a 5 2. Since k , k , it follows from (25) that p , p .D S D S D
Therefore, for this class of cost functions and a > 2, irrespective of the distribution
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of preferences, price is higher under dual ownership even though quality is lower
16in that regime.
Theorem 4. When the ( fixed) costs of quality provision of each of the components
atake the form f(q) 5 cq /2 with a > 2, equilibrium price is higher under dual
ownership than under sole ownership, even though equilibrium quality is lower
under dual ownership.
The quality, price, surplus, and profits differences across ownership structures
are very significant. For example, if the distribution is uniform on [0, 1], it is easy
1 1
] ]21 211 2a a* * ] ]to show that u 5 1/2, u 5 2/3, so that q 5 ( ) .v, q 5 ( ) .v, p 5S D s d S4 9
1
]2(a11) / (a21) a 2(a11) 21 21 / (a21)
a2 v, p 5 (2 3 ) v, where v 5 (ac) . Then, at a52, q /D D
q 5 8/9, and, p /p 5 27/32. Thus, in this example, vertical disintegrationS S D
implies a quality deterioration of 11%, a price increase of 16%, and a reduction in
market coverage by 33% (from 1/2 to 1/3). These differences imply that vertical
disintegration results in a 60.5% reduction in consumers’ surplus since CS /D
* * *CD 5 32/81 . 0.395, a 21% reduction in profits since (P 1 P ) /P 5 64/S A B S
1781 . 0.79, and a 41% reduction in total surplus since TS /TS 5 16/27 . 0.59.D S
7. Extensions
All results can easily be extended to n . 2 complementary products combined in
fixed proportions. The calculations for the integrated monopolist do not change
except for the extra fixed costs for each of the n components. Price equilibrium for
disintegrated monopolists is similar, with n substituted for 2 in Eq. (8):
* * *≠P /≠p 5 ≠P /≠p 5 1 2 F(u ) 2u f(u ) /n 5 0. (80)A A B B
* *Then the argument proving u ,u and p (q) , p (q) follows as before. TheS D S D
argument of Theorem 2, proving that quality is lower in disintegrated ownership,
again can easily be replicated for n complementary goods. Similarly, the welfare
comparisons of Theorem 3 follow directly. Finally, the argument for Theorem 4
also follows in the same manner as for two firms; thus price is also higher for
disintegrated monopolists with power functions as fixed costs of quality.
The results can also be extended to other specifications of the composite good’s
quality as a function of the qualities of the components. The minimum function,
min(q , q ), is the limit of a constant elasticity of substitution function as the1 2
16 Note that a > 2 is a sufficient condition. For some distribution functions, p , p holds for smallerS D
a, 1 , a , 2.
17 See also Economides and Lehr (1995).
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elasticity of substitution tends to zero. In general, we may posit that the quality of
r r 1 /rthe composite good is q 5 [(q 1 q ) /2] , which implies a constant elasticityAB A B
of substitution s 5 1/(1 2 r). It is easy to show that the limit as s fi 0
(equivalently as r fi 2 `) of this CES function is the minimum function. By
continuity, all results established for the minimum function hold for the CES
function with small elasticity of substitution s.
8. Concluding remarks
We have discussed the effect of vertical integration of two monopolists on the
quality level of composite goods. The effects of the lack of vertical integration on
price are known. The interesting result established here is that lack of vertical
integration leads to a reduction in quality, lower market coverage, and smaller
consumer surplus and profits. These results do not arise from a lack of
coordination between the disintegrated (dual) monopolists in the choice of quality,
since they both choose the same quality level. Instead, the difference of quality
between the two ownership structures arises out of the change of the strategic
incentives implied by the different ownership structures. In disintegrated owner-
ship, quality improvements have a bigger impact on price; thus, firms save on
quality costs by choosing a lower quality while achieving the same impact on
price.
We also proved for a wide class of cost functions and any distribution of
consumers that, despite the provision of a lower quality level, disintegrated
monopolists will charge a higher price, in comparison with a vertically integrated
monopolist. Finally, the results of this paper were established in a framework of no
economies of scope and no costs of coordination. Introduction of either economies
of scope or costs of coordination would strengthen our results.
An interesting question for further research is the extent that these results can be
generalized in other market structures, where there is a degree of competition in
the market for each component. In the presence of competition, the issue of quality
choice is more complicated since vertically integrated firms have the option to
produce components that are totally or partially incompatible with products (or
components) of competitors, thereby foreclosing or disadvantaging competitors.
Under these circumstances, a vertically integrated firm with significant market
power in the market for at least one of the components may also have incentives to
raise the costs of rivals in one or both markets by either degrading quality or
18
creating incompatibilities. Thus, in the presence of competition, strategic
decisions of quality provision should be analyzed in conjunction with decisions on
19the degree and extent of compatibility.
18 See Economides (1997).
19 For a comprehensive discussion of compatibility and related issues, see Economides (1996).
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